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Abstract: This paper examines the determinants of female autonomy using data from India. 
We model female autonomy for movement as well as economic decision-making 
using a summative index approach. Our contributions to the literature include a 
careful examination of the regional differences, tests of economic and sociological 
hypotheses on female autonomy and the use of pre-marriage autonomy measures in 
terms of employment status to determine post-marriage autonomy. Our results suggest 
that economic, sociological and pre-marriage autonomy factors explain female 
autonomy. Regional differences regarding the economic, sociological and pre-
marriage autonomy factors play a role in determining female autonomy.  
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1. Introduction 
The social structure and orthodox traditions present in India encourage gender 
discrimination in favour of the male child.  The situation is compounded due to a lack of 
adequate state-supported financial and health protection schemes for the elderly.  Under the 
patriarchal social system in India, the sons are not only expected to carry the family lineage 
but also to provide old age security for parents.  Generally, the widespread (and rising) 
prevalence of dowry and social taboos have meant that daughters are often looked upon as a 
burden rather than an asset.  Over the years India has implemented several measures to 
improve the status of women including a sub-section [15(3)] of its constitution  (Government 
of India (1950) that allows for affirmative action in favour of women.1 Specific legislative 
initiatives include: the 1961 Dowry Prohibition Act; the 1976 Equal Remuneration Act; the 
2005 Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act; and the 2006 Prohibition of Child 
Marriage Act.  In spite of these initiatives, the magnitude and extent of gender discrimination 
has assumed alarming proportions.  This is reflected in the skewed sex ratio and the rising 
incidents of (sexual) violence against women in recent years.  The last few censuses in India 
have indicated that there has been a clear decline in the sex ratio from 972 females for every 
1000 males in 1901 to 943 for every 1000 males in 2011.2 For the period 2001 to 2006 there 
has been a general rise in crimes against women. In particular there have been increases in 
the number of reported dowry deaths from 6,851 to 7,618 and incidents of cruelty by a 
husband or a relative from 49,170 to 63,128.3   
In India, considerable regional disparity exists with states located in the southern part 
of the country registering comparatively lesser gender imbalance than those situated in the 
north. For example, the sex-ratio in Uttar Pradesh (a northern Indian state) for 1991 and 2011 
was 884 and 912 females per 1000 males respectively; while for Tamil Nadu (a southern 
Indian state) it was 960 and 996 females per 1000 males respectively.4 The gap in the 
male/female literacy rate in Tamil Nadu is 12.95 in 2011 as compared to 17.99 in 2001. For 
                                               
1See the Ministry of Women and Child Development (2009: 4-5) for a listing of the constitutional and legal 
provisions in relation to the protection and promotion of women¶V rights in India.  
2
 Source: For the year 1901, sex ratio is taken from Census of India ± 2011a ( Gender Composition of the 
Population ± Pg 80 available from http://www.censusindia.gov.in/2011-prov-
results/data_files/india/Final_PPT_2011_chapter5.pdf ).  Note, data for 2011 includes the final estimates as 
released by the Census of India (2011b).   
3Source: Ministry of Women and Child Development, Government of India (2007).  
4Data for both 1991 and 2011 include final estimates as reported by Census of India (2011b).  For further details 
refer to http://www.censusindia.gov.in/DigitalLibrary/archive_home.aspx). 
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Uttar Pradesh the corresponding literacy gap is 19.98 in 2011 and 26.60 in 2001.5 In 2015, 
1.8 percent of the total reported crime against women was from Tamil Nadu as against 10.9 
percent in Uttar Pradesh.6 These numbers indicate a large north-south gap in the status of 
women.  
Divergent rationales have been provided in the existing literature to explain the large 
north-south gap in the status of women. Dyson and Moore (1983) explain the evidence of 
greater autonomy of women in south India compared to that in the north in terms of existing 
marriage practices. In the northern states, marriages are exogamic ± unrelated by kinship and 
also by place of birth / residence.  Neither do women have the right to inherit property.  In 
contrast to this, in southern states marriage practices are endogamous; marriages are more 
likely to take place between relations and post marriage women reside close to their natal 
home.  Women may also sometimes inherit / transfer property right.  Such difference has 
resulted in better status of women in the south due to more contact with their natal family, 
greater control over resources (including her dowry) and freedom of movement and 
communication.7  
Bardhan (1974) explained the north-south divide in terms of different agricultural 
systems prevalent in the two regions. Dry land cultivation in the (wheat growing) North-India 
as compared to the wetland cultivation (rice growing) in the South-India requires less 
participation of females in the production process, thereby reducing their income generation 
activities. This in turn has propagated discrimination against daughters in the northern states.  
This is refuted by Dasgupta (1987) who observed that both Punjab and Haryana have 
witnessed a high degree of female participation in the agricultural production process 
(activities like sowing, weeding, harvesting and threshing are considered an integral part of 
housework).  She, in agreement with Dyson and Moore (1987), attributed the regional 
differences in female status to the exogamous marriage rules in Punjab. This line of argument 
has also been supported by other studies, such as Basu (1992) and Jejeebhoy and Sathar 
(2001).  However, lack of adequate economic and district controls potentially leads to an 
overestimate of the regional effect in the above mentioned studies. In part this criticism is 
validated by the Rahman and Rao (2004) who found that regional differences disappear with 
                                               
5Source: Census of India (2011c).  Also literacy rate figures for 2011 are provisional.  For further details please 
UHIHU WR µ6WDWH RI /LWHUDF\¶ 3DJH -117 available from http://censusindia.gov.in/2011-prov-
results/data_files/india/Final_PPT_2011_chapter6.pdf . 
6
 See Table 5.1, Crime in India (2015), National Crime Records Bureau,  Ministry of Home Affairs (Web-Site: 
http://ncrb.gov.in/index.htm ) 
7For an excellent and in-depth survey of the explanations of differences in autonomy also see Rahman and Rao 
(2004). 
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more detailed economic controls.8   But Rahman and Rao treat the North-South difference as 
an intercept effect only which is a highly restrictive specification.   
The earlier literature focusing on unitary models of the household assumes a single 
decision-making agent with a single budget constraint corresponding to a single utility 
function, thus treating the household as an aggregate. In these models, a change in income of 
either the husband or wife level has identical implications thus giving the impression that a 
wife has an equal level of autonomy in the household relative to her husband. However, the 
unitary household models fail to address intra-household inequality and household 
composition-related issues. 
The non-unitary models can be classified into two categories known as cooperative 
and non-cooperative models. The cooperative models recognize individual utility functions 
using threat points for each member of the household. The threat points may or may not be 
external to the household and a function of some distribution factors, for example both 
husbandV¶ and wiYHV¶ incomes, but not their pooled income. According to the cooperative 
models, a household maximizes the weighted sum of a husband and wife¶V utility functions, 
where tKHUHODWLYHZHLJKWRIWKHZLIH¶VXWLOLW\IXQFWLRQFDSWXUHVKHUEDUJDLQLQJ power relative 
to her husband. The relative weight depends on some distributional factors, such as husband 
DQGZLIH¶VLQFRPHHGXFDWLRQDODWWDLQPHQWHWF. The main conclusion that emerges from these 
models is that the consumption decisions are influenced by the distribution factors, which in 
turn depend on the relative bargaining power between a husband and wife. This is how 
ZRPHQ¶V DXWRQRP\ PD\ EH OLQNHG ZLWK WKHVH PRGHOV RI KRXVHKROG GHFLVLRQ-making 
processes in the household. 
The non-cooperative models concentrate on WKH µVHSDUDWH VSKHUH¶ PRGHO RI
households in particular. In these models, the pooled budget constraint is absent. The husband 
and wife maximize his/her own utility function subject to individual budget constraints 
assuming the decisions of others in the household as given. Lundberg and Pollak (1994) also 
discuss the non-cooperative models by including cultural factors where equilibrium depends 
on the resource control by a husband or wife. Anderson and Eswaran (2009) find that, in the 
case of Bangladeshi women, with an increase in the employed status of a woman, her threat 
utility and level of bargaining power relative to her husband increases. In another study, 
Eswaran and Malhotra (2011) firmly argue that a IDPLO\¶V evolutionary past is more relevant 
than just employment status for ZRPHQ¶V KRXVHKROG DXWRQRP\. In this study domestic 
                                               
8See also Kishor (1993), Malhotra, Vanneman and Kishor (1995), and Menon and Johnson (2007) for studies 
that also fail to find the north/south differences on female autonomy. 
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violence experienced by women from her husband was found to impinge her autonomy and 
in this context evolutionary theory as expounded by psychologists play an important role.  
The latter associate domestic violence to paternity uncertainty and hencHDµQDWXUDO¶WHQGHQF\
of men to exercise proprietary right over women sexuality and reduce her freedom to inter-act 
with the outside world / men.  More recently, Eswaran et al. (2013) find that cultural factors, 
including family status and caste, play a substantial role in GHWHUPLQLQJZRPHQ¶VDXWRQRP\
in the case of India.  
In our framework, we explicitly control for endogamous marriage and test directly the 
Dyson and Moore hypothesis, which is our first contribution to the existing literature.  Our 
second contribution to the existing literature is that in addition to marriage pattern, we focus 
RQ WKH UROH RI WKUHH QHZ YDULDEOHV RQ IHPDOH DXWRQRP\ WZR YDULDEOHV FDSWXULQJ WKH ZLIH¶V
autonomy prior to marriage, DQG D WKLUG H[DPLQLQJ WKH ZLIH¶V exposure to media. 9,10 Our 
econometric modelling strategy to examine the determinants of female autonomy also departs 
from the rest of the literature in two ways. Traditionally researchers have estimated the 
autonomy equations using single equation techniques. However, we would expect a 
correlation across these autonomy decisions. We contribute to the existing literature by 
jointly estimating (using a multivariate probit model) the autonomy equations to take account 
of the correlation that exists across the autonomy measures. We split the seven autonomy 
measures into two groups: the first set is movement autonomy for family needs (going to the 
market to buy foods for family, going to the health care centre, going to the fields and going 
to the commercial centre) and the second set consists of movement autonomy for leisure 
activities (going to visit family or friends, going to the fair, and going to the neighbouring 
village).  
The fourth contribution is the specification of regional effects in a way that deviates 
significantly from the existing literature. Traditionally the regional effects are modelled as 
either an intercept effect (Rahman & Rao (2004)) or a complete separation of all parameters 
across the states. We argue that the difference in these regional parameters is due to the 
socio-cultural differences across the two regions. For this reason, we use interaction terms of 
                                               
9Using data from Bangladesh, Anderson and Eswaran (2009) demonstrate the importance of current income 
opportunLWLHVRIWKHZLIHDQGLWVHIIHFWRQWKHZLIH¶VDXWRQRP\DIWHUFRQWUROOLQJIRUWKHHQGRJHQHLW\RIFXUUHQW
income by using an instrumental variable (IV) technique. Earned income by the wife does have a significant 
positive effect on female autonomy.  Our model is developed on similar lines.  
10%KDWWDFKDU\D %HGL DQG &KKDFKKL  H[SORUH WKH UHODWLRQVKLS EHWZHHQ ZRPHQ¶V FXUUHQW SDUWLFLSDWLRQ LQ
paid work and the ownership of assets with spousal violence.  To control for plausible endogenity between 
ZRPHQ¶V Furrent economic status and domestic violence, the paper has simultaneously determined a two-
equation violence and work status model using a bivariate probit model.  Though the issue covered in this paper 
is distinctly different from ours the underlying framework is similar.  
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the regional variables with education, age, dowry, media exposure, husband being a relative, 
employment before marriage, choice of selection of husband and the development regional 
dummy as determinants of the autonomy equation. 
Our results suggest that marriage to a relative exerts a significant effect on female 
autonomy in some of the autonomy measures. We also provide some evidence favouring the 
North-South difference. The Hindu religion dummy has a positive statistically significant 
effect on all types of autonomy of movement for family needs and two of three categories for 
leisure activities. WiIH¶VHGXFDWLRQPHGLDH[SRVXUH and age play a positive significant role in 
determining female autonomy in Tamil Nadu (except for one category of movement 
DXWRQRP\ LQ FDVH RI ZLIH¶V HGXFDWLRQ DQG RQH FDWHJRU\ RI OHLVXUH DXWRQRP\ IRU PHGLD
exposure); however the impact runs in opposite and significant ways in the case of Uttar 
Pradesh. Also, in Tamil Nadu pre-marriage paid employment in general positively affects 
movement and leisure autonomy. If the women can exercise her rights in choice for selecting 
a partner, the association is mainly positive in case of Tamil Nadu.  
The remaining parts of this paper are organized into the following sections. The next 
section will introduce the data set and the variables that we will use to model female 
autonomy. Section 3 describes the estimation methodology along with the results. We 
provide a comparison between female employment, autonomy and the socio-economic 
construct of the two states in Section 4 and Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Data Set and Variable Description 
We use the data set µSurvey on the Status of Women and Fertility¶ (SWAF), 
conducted by University of Pennsylvania in the year 1993-94 for five countries.11 The data 
for India was collected through the interviews with married women in the age-group of 15 to 
39 and their husbands for two Indian states: Tamil Nadu in the south and Uttar Pradesh in the 
north. Two districts from each state (Meerut and Pratapgarh from Uttar Pradesh, and 
Coimbatore and Ramanathapuram from Tamil Nadu) were surveyed.12 The total number of 
available observations in the data set is 1,842 for the wives; however, only 1,660 husband 
surveys were completed. Our first restriction is to include only the observations in which both 
                                               
11For a detailed discussion on the sampling design, field reports, codebooks, datasets, questionnaires and 
publications, see Smith et al. (2000) retrieved from  http://swaf.pop.upenn.edu/datasets  .   
12The sex ratio in two districts of Tamil Nadu, Coimbatore (economically advanced) and Ramanathapuram 
(economically backward), at 959 and 1033 respectively are significantly different in 2001. The districts of 
Meerut (advanced) and Pratapgarh (backward) in Uttar Pradesh also record a considerably different sex-ratio 
in 2001 (871 and 983 respectively). So, there exists considerable heterogeneity in female social indicators both 
across and within the two states. 
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wives and husbands answered the survey. We also exclude the cases where both partners 
were married more than once and are left with 1,529 observations. At the state level the 
observations are 742 from Tamil Nadu and 787 from Uttar Pradesh. 13  
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics by state for our seven measures of autonomy. 
We report in the final column the difference in means test and the probability value 
associated with the test. In each sphere of autonomy, Tamil Nadu has a mean that is larger 
than that of Uttar Pradesh. The results from the means test provide strong evidence that 
females in Tamil Nadu enjoy more autonomy except for freedom of movement to visit the 
next village where no significant difference was established. 
[Insert Table 1 approximately here] 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics (by state) on the variables that we use to 
explain female autonomy. We consider both cultural and economic factors that may play a 
role in determining female autonomy. For the cultural factors we use three dummy variables: 
religion, caste and endogamous marriage, i.e. husband belongs to her natal family.  Previous 
literature documents that in Islamic societies, the position of the women is such that it 
restricts both her education and autonomy (Caldwell 1986; and Jeejebhoy & Sathar 2001). 
We use a dummy variable coded as one if the household is Hindu and, given the existing 
literature, we would expect a positive coefficient associated with this variable. In both states 
around 50% of the households are Hindu. Given historically determined social fragmentation 
based on caste system we have introduced a dummy that takes the value of one if the 
respondent is from a marginalised / backward caste (Jeejebhoy 2000).14 The percentage of 
households who belong to the disadvantaged caste is around 12% for both Tamil Nadu and 
Uttar Pradesh. Dyson and Moore (1983) have highlighted the role of different marriage 
practices across north and south India. We introduce a variable coded as one if her husband is 
a direct relative and allow for this parameter to differ across Tamil Nadu and Uttar Pradesh to 
control for this feature. We observe that 56 percent of the wives in Tamil Nadu are married 
                                               
13With the exception of the caste variable, all the variables used in this framework DUHGHULYHGIURPWKHZLIH¶V
questionnaire. In terms of the autonomy variables there are equivalent answers provided by the husband so it is 
possible with the SWAF data to examine the issue of convergence/divergence in husband and wife views of 
female autonomy. Jejeebhoy (2002) examines this and finds that one-half to three-quarters of the husbands 
GLVDJUHHZLWKWKHLUZLIH¶VDQVZHUZLWKWKHKXVEDQGWHQGLQJWRDWWULEXWHPRUHDXWRQRP\WRWKHLUZLIHWKDQWKH
ZLIH¶V RZQDQVZHU:KLOH WKLVLVDQLQWHUHVWLQJLVVXH worthy of further research we would argue that in the 
FRQWH[WRIGHWHUPLQDQWVRIIHPDOHDXWRQRP\WKHZLIH¶VDQVZHULVWKHUHOHYDQWRQHLQWKLVDQDO\VLV 
14In about eleven percent of the cases, the religion and caste of the husband and wife did not match. However, 
ZH XVHKXVEDQG¶V UHOLJLRQ DQG FDVWH DV LQ ,QGLD WKH FXVWRPVDQG WUDGLWLRQV RI WKHKXVEDQG¶V IDPLO\ PDWWHUV
LUUHVSHFWLYHRIWKHZLIH¶VUHOLJLRQRUFDVWH 
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within the natal family compared to only 14 percent in Uttar Pradesh and the difference is 
statistically significant.  
We follow the literature and use standard economic variables that capture labour 
market opportunities for wives. To control for human capital we use female education 
(measured as years of education).15 In our sample, in Tamil Nadu, the average years of 
schooling for wives is 3.37 compared to 1.95 in Uttar Pradesh and this difference is 
statistically significant.  The impact of education of wives could differ between Tamil Nadu 
and Uttar Pradesh and WRDFFRXQWIRUWKLVZHKDYHLQWHUDFWHGZLIH¶V\HDUVRIHGXFDWLRQZLWK
the state dummy.  The household bargaining model stresses the importance of the difference 
in earnings capacity between husband and wife, which we control for by including the 
difference in education between husband and wife (measured in number of years). According 
to the bargaining model, this variable should have a negative impact RQWKHZLIH¶VDXWRQRP\
The average difference in education between husband and wife is significantly higher in Uttar 
Pradesh.   
Consistent with Sathar and Kazi (2000), we control for the age of the wife.  In 
addition to this, to account for the varied regional effect of age, we incorporate an interaction 
dummy. We also include the difference in age between husband and wife. The age difference 
variable can have both an economic and cultural interpretation. The economic interpretation 
is that the difference in age reflects differences in experience and hence in earning capacity. 
On a cultural level if the age gap between husband and wife is closer, then the probability that 
they will share similar view-points on several issues is higher. Table 2 indicates that in Tamil 
Nadu the mean difference in age is 5.6 years and that in Uttar Pradesh is 4.8 years.  
 
[Insert Table 2 approximately here]  
An important family wealth variable is dowry but it raises some important conceptual 
issues especially in terms of the intra-household resource allocation models.16 The practice of 
dowry has a long history in the north of India and for the upper castes/classes in South India 
(Srinivasan and Bedi 2007). At the present time, exchange of dowry during marriage is 
practiced by all castes/classes in India. However, the operation of the dowry differs across the 
north and south of India. In the south women have ownership of a large part of their dowry 
and enjoy a say over its usage after marriage. In the north, the practice is that the husband has 
                                               
15Jeejebhoy and Sathar (2001) report that secondary school educated women participate more in family 
decisions than those with less education, using data from the  States of  Tamil Nadu and Uttar Pradesh in India 
and Punjab in Pakistan. 
16See Bloch and Rao (2002) and Srinivasan (2005) for an analysis of dowry payments in India. 
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command over the dowry once it has been exchanged.17 Hence, in the south, a greater dowry 
ZRXOGPHDQDKLJKHUFRQWULEXWLRQRIWKHZRPDQLQKRXVHKROG¶VSRRORIUHVRXUFHVDQGKHQFHD
higher autonomy. However, in the north the dowry would increase the KXVEDQG¶VHFRQRPLF
status and would have a negative effect on female autonomy. Given this difference in 
plausible impact of dowry across the two regions we need an interaction term between dowry 
variable and regional location. We do not use the actual value of the dowry, rather we use 
whether land, cash, jewellery or car/livestock was exchanged at the marriage, weighted by 
village level incidence of each of the potential forms of the dowry. As Table 2 indicates the 
dowry index in Uttar Pradesh is significantly larger than the value obtained for Tamil Nadu.   
In the data set there is a variable which labels the level of economic and social 
development by district and about 50 percent of the district are labelled as backward in both 
states. This indicates that there is economic and social heterogeneity within the states that 
needs to be controlled for. This variable will help to control for the intra-state economic 
differences that will affect the opportunities females have in the labour market. As discussed 
in relation to %DUGKDQ¶V74) work it is important to consider the structure of the economy 
when examining states in the north and south of India and for this reason we will interact this 
with the Uttar Pradesh dummy variable.  
Although we control for education, exposure to knowledge / information can also take 
place WKURXJKRWKHUFKDQQHOVIRULQVWDQFHµDFFHVVWRPHGLD¶. We use a dummy variable coded 
as one if the wife is exposed to the media (newspaper, television or radio). This exposure will 
make her more aware and cognisant about the environment, and represents an increase in her 
general knowledge. For both these reasons we expect it positively to influence the autonomy 
the wife enjoys. In Tamil Nadu, around 57% of the wives have experienced media exposure 
compared to 43% in case of Uttar Pradesh, and this proportional difference is significant. 
Finally, we introduce two new variables to the literature capturing past autonomy 
behaviour enjoyed by the wife before marriage. Our underlying hypothesis is that autonomy 
LVDOHDUQHGEHKDYLRXUDQGWKDWSDVWDXWRQRPRXVEHKDYLRXULPSDFWVRQWRGD\¶VEHKDYLRXU2XU
first variable looks at ZRPDQ¶Vpaid labour supply prior to marriage.18 The dummy variable is 
coded as one if the wife had a paid job prior to marriage. In our sample, 37% of the females 
                                               
17Based on the same dDWDVHW-HHMHEKR\FRQVWUXFWVDQLQGH[RI³VD\RYHUGRZU\´7KH average for women 
in Tamil Nadu is 1.53 as compared to 0.62 for women in Uttar Pradesh where the higher value indicates higher 
control with the highest taking a value of 2. 
18There is a more general labour supply variable that captures both paid and unpaid labour supply but we use the 
paid only version. We were concerned that unpaid version was also capturing free family labour that was not 
autonomous. 
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in Tamil Nadu were involved in terms of paid work outside her household before marriage 
while only 4% of the wives in Uttar Pradesh were. Besides the learned behaviour argument 
the women with past work experience can enjoy more opportunities in the labour market after 
marriageZKLFKFDQ LQFUHDVH WKHZLIH¶V EDUJDLQLQJSRZHUZLWKLQ WKHKRXVHKROG, and this is 
also represented by this variable. Both of our arguments postulate a positive effect on female 
autonomy within the household. But the paid employment variable is plausibly correlated 
with other unobserved attributes of both the husband and wife (e.g., the wife having a special 
skill), and this unobserved attribute could be driving autonomy later. Our framework takes 
into account this potential endogeneity. We also postulate that the impact of this variable 
could vary across states simply because of divergent labour market opportunities and 
therefore we allow for the presence of regional effect in this variable.  
Autonomy enjoyed by the woman pre-marriage is also deciphered by the freedom she 
could exercise in the choice of her husband. In particular, the wife was asked about her role 
in the choice of husband with two possible answers: she chose her partner or her parents 
consulted her prior to the choice being made. In our sample only 5% of the Tamil Nadu 
females enjoyed this freedom while 7% of the wives in Uttar Pradesh had such a role in the 
choice of husband. This shows that the vast majority are arranged marriages in which the 
wife to be plays no role. In India parents typically arrange marriages, and marriages are 
assortative in nature. Therefore this variable could be potentially endogenous with the 
decision-making after marriage, especially if the husband is a relative. In our framework, we 
have already controlled for the husband being a relative variable, and we argue that if a wife 
was able to exercise at least some measure of autonomy in the marriage decision then they 
would expect some autonomy in decision making after the marriage. So we expect this 
variable to have a positive effect on female autonomy. 
 
3. Estimation Methodology and Empirical Results 
3.1 Estimation Methodology 
We use multivariate probit model by focusing on two aspects of female movement autonomy: 
movement for family needs, and movement for leisure activity.  Multivariate probit model 
estimates M-equation probit models by the method of maximum simulated likelihood (MSL) 
and allows for the presence of correlations in the variance-covariance matrix of the cross-
 11 
equation error-terms.19 In our case, for the family movement autonomy, we estimate a 4-
equation model where as in case of leisure autonomy we have a 3-equation model. In all 
cases when the woman is able to exercise autonomy the variable is coded as one. Actual 
autonomy *( )y  is unobserved but we will assume it is a function of various socio-economic 
characteristics. To estimate this we will use a latent variable construct so that the underlying 
the model for autonomy in a single equation is thus given by: 
*
.y xE H 
                                                                                                                             (1) 
where x  denote various socio-economic characteristics, E  a vector of behavioral parameters 
and we will assume that  ~ 0,1i NH . We use the multivariate probit model as this model will 
capture the latent correlations capture the cross±dependencies in latent utilities across 
categories in autonomy. This model is analogous to the SUR model with binary variables.   
We start from the prior understanding that the parameters represent behavioural 
effects on female autonomy. This viewpoint suggests that we require a theoretical or 
institutional reason for a regional effect to allow for the estimation of a separate parameter 
across the two states. For a number of variables the arguments suggests that the parameters 
will differ across the two states. Following the theoretical guidance for this difference, we 
have estimated an interaction version of the autonomy equation for variables such as 
education, age, dowry, media exposure, husband being a relative, employment before 
marriage, choice of selection of husband and the development regional dummy. 
3.2 Empirical Results 
One may argue that employment before marriage is an endogenous variable. To address this 
issue, we have conducted Hausman test for each variable.20 We report the results in Table 3. 
A uniform conclusion emerges from Table 3: employment before marriage is exogenous in 
our framework.  
Table 3 should be inserted here 
                                               
19For details, see Greene (2012). 
20
 We run a linear probability model where we claim that marriage before employment depends on whether the 
female is staying in a city; the number of years she is single; and the number of years of education that her 
parents have. We calculate the estimated value of the residual of this regression and use this simultaneously with 
the original previous employment variable. If the coefficient of the estimated residual is insignificant, then we 
claim that marriage before employment is exogenous in our framework. We also estimate another version of the 
multivariate probit model by allowing for another equation for pre-employment marriage where pre-
employment marriage is being modeled as a function of whether the female is staying in a city, number of years 
she is being single, and number of years of education that her parents have along with state and region effects.  
The results from this model remain qualitatively the same as the one reported in the paper.         
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Table 4 and 5 report the results of the Multivariate Probit estimation of our two measures of 
female movement autonomy. The religion dummy is statistically significant for movement 
autonomy in case of family needs in all four cases, and two out of three categories in case of 
leisure movement autonomy. The result implies that Hindu families do offer greater female 
autonomy than the non-Hindu families. The caste variable is almost insignificant except for 
family autonomy measure captured in terms of going to a field or a commercial centre and 
our result contrasts with Eswaran et al. (2013). The coefficient associated with the variable 
µhusband being a relative¶ is positively significant in two of three leisure autonomy measures, 
and only in one case for the movement autonomy. We also observe that there exists evidence 
of behavioural differences across the North and South of India as the interaction parameter is 
statistically significant in few cases. Our result is thus supportive of the Dyson and Moore 
hypothesis to some extent.  
Our intra-state heterogeneity variable µBackward District¶ produces different patterns 
of effects across the two forms of autonomy. With respect to family movement autonomy we 
find a volume effect; however an increase in female movement autonomy (for both family 
need and leisure) in Uttar Pradesh is observed if the wives live in the backward districts 
except for visiting a friend/relative. The sum of the two coefficients (volume effect and 
interaction effect) is positive in most of the cases and our result is in contrast with the 
prediction of Bardhan (1974). 
Table 4 and 5 should be inserted here 
The education and age effects are critical to the economic explanations of female autonomy 
and, in particular, intra-household bargaining models. An increase in the number of years of 
education increases female leisure autonomy. The coefficient of the interaction term 
(education interacting with Uttar Pradesh dummy) is negative and significant, implying that 
in Uttar Pradesh an increase in number of years of education decreases female autonomy. The 
sum of the coefficients (direct and interaction term) is negative. The result for the difference 
in education of the husband relative to their wife is negative and significant in three 
categories, justifying the bargaining explanation. ThH UHVXOW IRU WKH ZLIH¶V DJH SRUWUD\V D
positive and significant effect on all forms of female autonomy, although the same is not the 
case with Uttar Pradesh. The sum of the coefficients (direct and interaction term) is positive. 
The result on the age difference between husband and wives is mostly significant. So the 
results on these explicit earnings capacity variables as highlighted by the bargaining models 
produce a mixed result. Now human capital accumulation, and hence the opportunity set for 
the wife, is best viewed as a continuous process and, as argued in the previous section, our 
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media exposure variable and the results in Table 4 and Table 5 are consistent with this 
interpretation. But the impact varies across the two states. Both the education and the media 
exposure variable highlight the regional difference existing in India.    
The results regarding the composite dowry variable imply that in Tamil Nadu, an 
increase in dowry increases the level of female autonomy while in Uttar Pradesh it results in a 
decrease in female autonomy in the case of family movement autonomy. However in the case 
of leisure movement autonomy, the result is exactly the opposite. The sum of the two 
coefficients (direct and the interaction term) is negative in two cases and positive in the 
remaining five cases. Our first result is consistent with the prediction of the intra-household 
bargaining model since males control the dowry resources in the northern states such as Uttar 
Pradesh while women control these assets in the southern states. However our second result 
differs from the prediction of the intra-household bargaining model.  
In terms of our pre-marriage employment autonomy variable all four parameter 
estimates in the family movement autonomy equations are positive and significant. This is in 
line with what our learned behaviour hypothesis implies. In the case of leisure movement we 
obtain significant parameter estimates in all the three categories. The differential impact 
estimates for Uttar Pradesh differs across the category but the coefficient is significant in five 
out of seven cases. The other pre-marriage female autonomy variable captured in terms of 
expressing a choice in selecting partner is significant in most of the cases, and the differential 
impact for Uttar Pradesh is negative. Each of our variables provides evidence that prior 
autonomy does affect intra-family female autonomy, while the estimates of the parameters 
highlight the existing regional difference in India. We end this section with the following 
observation: all the correlation coefficients capturing the cross±dependencies in latent utilities 
across items in autonomy are significant, and this justifies the use of a multivariate probit 
model. 
 
4. Recent Trends in Autonomy, Female Employment and Socio-economic Status       
Given that the SWAF survey belongs to 1993-94, one can argue that the mobility of women 
has grown in leaps and bounds since then as has the economic condition with modernisation 
and different policy initiatives aimed at the uplifting of women¶V status. In this section, 
hence, we compare the trends for the last twenty years and focus on key variables such as 
female employment, autonomy, and their socio-economic status. A comparison of the literacy 
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rate using the Census of India from both 2001 and 201121, as shown earlier,  reveals that for 
both Uttar Pradesh and Tamil Nadu, the gender gap in the literacy rate has declined ± but 
even in 2011 the male literacy rate is considerably higher than the female literacy rate. In 
Table 6, we focus on female employment, and autonomy using the National Family Health 
Survey data (rounds 2 and 3, conducted in 1998-99 and in 2005-06 respectively). 
Table 6 inserted here 
 We observe that the percentage of employed female who were paid in cash only has 
increased in Tamil Nadu by 4.2 percent where as in Uttar Pradesh it has fallen by 2.9 percent. 
In the case of female autonomy, the situation in Tamil Nadu has worsened in two dimensions 
-  seeking own health care and visiting parents/relatives; but increased in the case of 
purchasing jewellery or major household items. One can infer that employed women paid in 
cash enjoy greater autonomy at least in their purchasing decisions of major household items 
i.e. economic autonomy. The scenario in Uttar Pradesh is rather gloomy: both economic and 
movement autonomy has decreased from 1998-99 to 2005-06.          
5. Conclusion 
This paper is concerned with the intra-family decision-making and, in particular, the level of 
autonomy the wife enjoys in movement decisions, independent of her husband. To examine 
this issue we use the SWAF data set for the Indian states of Tamil Nadu and Uttar Pradesh. 
Prior theoretical and empirical literature which examined the determinants of autonomy 
identified the role of both sociological and economic factors. In India an important regional 
differential in female autonomy has been observed in the previous literature, and in this paper 
we use theory and institutional factors to determine the amount of regional variation. A final 
innovation introduced into this paper is the use of indicators of pre-marriage autonomy to 
determine post-marriage autonomy. Our results indicate that the pre-marriage employment 
autonomy variable shows a significant association with post-marriage autonomy. We also 
document that wives exercising a role in their choice of husband plays a role in the level of 
autonomous decisions that wives are able to make after marriage. Our other findings 
corroborate the existing literature: religion, education, and age play a role in determining the 
autonomy that a wife enjoys. Our results suggest the presence of the traditional North-South 
difference in female autonomy.  
                                               
21
 Census of India (2011c), op cit 
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The policy implications of our results are standard in one respect. Our education, 
functional literacy and age results all point towards a policy of universal and free basic 
education which provides women with earnings capacity and thus enhances their autonomy. 
Further, our dowry results suggest that policies that enhance female control of resources 
within the family are extremely important. For example, like the dowry, land inheritance has 
a similar North-South split (Agarwal 2003): women in Uttar Pradesh are severely constrained 
by state law in inheriting land. The states of Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra, Karnataka, and 
Tamil Nadu in 1986, 1989, 1994, and 1994, respectively amended the 1956 Hindu 
Succession Act (HSA) by ordering that the daughter of a coparcener i.e. an individual with 
ownership rights of an undivided estate will become a coparcener herself by birth, i.e. 
acquiring a status equal to that of a son. Similar national-level changes were made in 2005. 
Deininger et al. (2006) observe that the amendments to HSA act led to genuine improvement 
LQZRPHQ¶VVRFLR-economic status. Our result in terms of dowry suggests that this change in 
owner-ship right of women will have a strong effect on female autonomy and can indicate a 
potential policy change.  
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Table 1 
Dependent Variable: Sample Descriptive Statistics and State Differences 
State Tamil Nadu (South India) Uttar Pradesh (North India) 
TN>UP 
t-Stat Variable Mean Standard Deviation Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Movement Autonomy for Family Needs      
   Going to Market to buy food 0.815 0.014 0.097 0.011 28.264 (0.000) 
   Going to Health Care Centre    0.441 0.018 0.108 0.011 14.654 (0.000) 
   Going to Field 0.315 0.017 0.066 0.009 12.493 (0.000) 
   Going to Commercial Centre 0.238 0.016 0.074 0.009 8.933 (0.000) 
 
     
Movement Autonomy for Leisure Activity      
   Going to visit Family/Friend 0.647 0.018 0.086 0.010 22.842 (0.000) 
   Going to a Fair    0.164 0.014 0.057 0.008 6.719 (0.000) 
   Going to a Neighbouring Village 0.034 0.007 0.058 0.008 -2.299 (0.989) 
 
     
Observations 742 787  
Note: In the column TN>UP t-Stat the number in () is the probability value associated with the alternative hypothesis that the proportion differs between the two 
states.  
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Table 2 
Independent Variables: Sample Descriptive Statistics and State Differences 
State Tamil Nadu (South India) Uttar Pradesh (North India) Not Equal 
Test 
Statistic Variable Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Religion Dummy: Dummy Variable Coded 1 if 
Wife is Hindu 0.508 0.018 0.513 0.018 
-0.206 
(0.837) 
Caste Dummy: Dummy Variable Coded 1 if 
Wife a Member of Lower Caste 0.116 0.012 0.127 0.012 
-0.667 
(0.505) 
Husband a Relative: Dummy Variable Coded 1 
if Husband is from Natal Family  0.569 0.018 0.140 0.012 
17.600  
(0. 000) 
Schooling of Wife (Years of Schooling)  3.368 3.391 1.945 3.369 8.224 (0.000) 
Difference in Schooling between Husband and 
Wife (Years of Schooling) 1.597 3.529 4.437 4.632 
-13.532 
(0.000) 
Age of the Wife (Years) 29.022 6.163 27.464 6.449 4.829 (0.000) 
Difference in Age between Husband and Wife 5.643 2.796 4.795 2.823 6.470 (0.000) 
Composite Dowry Exchanged: Number of 
components {land, cash, jewelry, 
car/livestock} in the dowry received 
weighted by village average. 
0.517 0.573 0.691 0.605 -5.760 (0.000) 
Media Exposure of Wife: Dummy Variable 
Coded 1 if exposed to the media {newspaper, 
radio and/or TV}. 
0.573 0.018 0.431 0.018 5.551 (0.000) 
Table 2 Continued on Next Page 
 20 
Table 2 
Independent Variables: Sample Descriptive Statistics and State Differences 
State Tamil Nadu (South India) Uttar Pradesh (North India) Not Equal 
Test 
Statistic Variable Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Table 2 Continued on Next Page 
Wife had paid work before Marriage: Dummy 
Variable. 0.371 0.018 0.038 0.009 
16.261 
(0.000) 
Wife Enjoyed some Choice in Selecting 
Partner: Chose or Consulted by Parents. 0.047 0.008 0.074 0.009 
-2.169 
(0.030) 
Observations 742 787  
Note: In the column Not Equal t-Stat the number in () is the probability value associated with the alternative hypothesis that the two means are different from one 
another. 
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Table 3 
Hausman Test for Endogeneity of Prior Employment 
 Family Movement Autonomy 
 Market Health Center Field Commercial Center 
F2 test -statistic 1.715 1.027 0.015 0.792 
p-value 0.190 0.311 0.904 0.374 
 Leisure Activity Movement Autonomy 
 Family/Friend Fair Neighboring Village  
F2 test -statistic 1.958 0.181 0.927  
p-value 0.162 0.671 0.336  
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Table 4 
Multivariate Probit Results from Individual Family Autonomy Measures 
Explanatory Variables 
Autonomy Measures 
Market Health Field Commercial 
Religion Dummy 0.205** 0.420*** 0.479*** 0.396*** (0.103) (0.037) (0.030) (0.030) 
Caste Dummy 0.168 -0.042 0.198*** 0.082** (0.151) (0.047) (0.050) (0.040) 
Dummy if Husband from Natal 
Family  
-0.022 0.034 0.078*** -0.021 
(0.055) (0.024) (0.019) (0.016) 
UP* Husband a Relative Dummy 0.064 -0.045 0.249*** 0.271*** (0.224) (0.062) (0.029) (0.054) 
Backward District Dummy 0.207*** -0.260*** -0.027* -0.104*** (0.048) (0.018) (0.015) (0.012) 
UP*Backward District Dummy 0.286*** 1.003*** 0.520** 0.542*** (0.073) (0.026) (0.023) (0.017) 
UP Dummy -2.060*** -2.042*** -0.686*** -0.828*** (0.136) (0.059) (0.040) (0.033) 
:LIH¶V(GXFDWLRQ -0.011*** 0.021*** 0.0004 0.020*** (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
83:LIH¶V(GXFDWLRQ -0.059*** -0.083*** -0.090*** -0.072*** (0.007) (0.001) (0.005) (0.004) 
Difference in Education -0.025*** -0.014*** 0.002* 0.003*** (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
:LIH¶V$JH 0.054*** 0.034*** 0.038*** 0.034*** (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.0004) 
83:LIH¶V$JH -0.0002 0.030*** -0.003** 0.001* (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0007) 
Difference in Age -0.039*** -0.013*** -0.019*** -0.002* (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Composite Dowry Exchanged 0.092*** 0.317*** 0.161*** 0.141*** (0.032) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) 
UP*Composite Dowry Exchanged -0.004 -0.382*** -0.292*** -0.046** (0.055) (0.032) (0.013) (0.023) 
Media Exposure of Wife 0.309*** 0.129*** 0.252*** 0.128*** (0.010) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) 
UP*Media Exposure of Wife -0.458*** -0.083*** -0.493*** -0.218*** (0.020) (0.021) (0.026) (0.006) 
Employment Before Marriage 
Dummy 
0.258*** 0.100*** 0.269*** 0.153*** 
(0.028) (0.001) (0.011) (0.010) 
Table 4 Continued on Next Page 
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Table 4 
Multivariate Probit Results from Individual Family Autonomy Measures 
Explanatory Variables 
Autonomy Measures 
Market Health Field Commercial 
 
UP* Employment Before Marriage -0.158* 0.246*** -0.040 0.104 (0.085) (0.012) (0.170) (0.110) 
Choice in Selecting Partner Dummy -0.174*** 0.186*** 0.195*** 0.356*** (0.036) (0.015) (0.010) (0.011) 
UP*Choice in Selecting Partner -0.100 -0.042 -0.323* -1.065*** (0.101) (0.036) (0.166) (0.220) 
Testing and Diagnostics     
Joint Significance of Uttar Pradesh 
Interaction Terms 
351.419 
{8} 
[0.000] 
192.440 
{8} 
[0.000] 
161.712 
{8} 
[0.000] 
217.63 
{8} 
[0.000] 
 Health, MarketU  0.889*** (0.001) 
 Field, MarketU  0.815*** (0.007) 
 Commercial, MarketU  0.741*** (0.002) 
 Field, HealthU  0.733*** (0.006) 
 Commercial, HealthU  0.773*** (0.001) 
 Commercial, FieldU  0.811*** (0.001) 
Joint Significance of U  estimates 918.207 {6} 
[0.000] 
Log Pseudolikelihood -1862.604 
Observations 1529 
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses under the coefficient, * significant at 10%, ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Constant term is included in the model, but not 
reported.{} is degrees of freedom and [] is the probability value. 
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Table 5 
Multivariate Probit Results from Individual Leisure Autonomy Measures 
Explanatory Variables 
Autonomy Measures 
Friend/Relative Fair Neighboring Village 
Religion Dummy 0.075 0.208*** 0.185*** (0.109) (0.045) (0.047) 
Caste Dummy 0.181 -0.010 -0.009 (0.138) (0.045) (0.041) 
Dummy if Husband from Natal 
Family 
0.074 0.047* 0.092* 
(0.056) (0.026) (0.052) 
UP* Husband a Relative Dummy 0.215 0.225*** -0.060 (0.133) (0.052) (0.075) 
Backward District Dummy 0.587*** -0.278*** -0.552*** (0.043) (0.023) (0.042) 
UP*Backward District Dummy -0.186* 0.943*** 1.018*** (0.099) (0.048) (0.070) 
UP Dummy -1.444*** -1.090*** 0.282*** (0.073) (0.026) (0.064) 
:LIH¶V(GXFDWLRQ 0.024*** 0.064*** 0.044*** (0.004) (0.002) (0.001) 
83:LIH¶V(GXFDWLRQ -0.089*** -0.167*** -0.109*** (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) 
Difference in Education -0.009*** 0.012*** 0.009*** (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) 
:LIH¶V$JH 0.034*** 0.043*** 0.065*** (0.0002) (0.001) (0.002) 
83:LIH¶V$JH -0.001 0.010*** -0.009*** (0.0007) (0.001) (0.002) 
Difference in Age 0.0002 0.006*** -0.003*** (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Composite Dowry Exchanged -0.216*** -0.054*** -0.203*** (0.027) (0.009) (0.008) 
UP*Composite Dowry Exchanged 0.347*** 0.077* 0.289*** (0.063) (0.038) (0.028) 
Media Exposure of Wife 0.371*** -0.009 -0.203*** (0.003) (0.009) (0.018) 
UP*Media Exposure of Wife -0.362*** 0.028 0.215*** (0.015) (0.020) (0.018) 
Table 5 Continued on Next Page 
 
 25 
Table 5 
Multivariate Probit Results from Individual Leisure Autonomy Measures 
Explanatory Variables 
Autonomy Measures 
Friend/Relative Fair Neighboring Village 
Employment Before Marriage 
Dummy 
0.224*** 0.347*** 0.340*** 
(0.025) (0.011) (0.020) 
UP* Employment Before Marriage 0.172* 0.196*** -0.126** (0.089) (0.029) (0.049) 
Choice in Selecting Partner Dummy 0.216*** 0.251*** 0.929*** (0.019) (0.013) (0.020) 
UP*Choice in Selecting Partner -0.425*** -0.853*** -1.074*** (0.030) (0.079) (0.028) 
Testing and Diagnostics    
Joint Significance of Uttar Pradesh 
Interaction Terms 
638.791 
{8} 
[0.000] 
242.176 
{8} 
[0.000] 
161.299 
{8} 
[0.000] 
 Fair, RelativeU  0.732*** (0.002) 
 Next Village, RelativeU  0.750*** (0.013) 
 Next Village, FairU  0.845*** (0.004) 
Joint Significance of U  estimates 4811.564 {3} 
[0.000] 
Log Pseudolikelihood -1167.161 
Observations 1529 
Notes: Village clustered robust standard errors are in parentheses under the coefficient, * significant at 
10%, ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Constant term is included in the model, but not 
reported.{} is degrees of freedom and [] is the probability value.  
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Table 6: Selected Indicators for Married Women in the Age-group of 15-49 
Tamil Nadu and Uttar Pradesh 
  Tamil Nadu 
  1998-99 2005-06 
Employment Status 
Percentage of women who worked in past 12 months 53.8 48.4 
Percentage of employed women who were paid in cash only 71 75.2 
Autonomy Indicators where respondent / wife only decides on: 
Obtaining health care for herself / own health care (in percentage) 45.5 29.1 
Purchasing jewellery or other major household item (in percentage) 17.7 21.3 
Visiting her parents or other relatives (in percenatge) 29.6 20.7 
  Uttar Pradesh 
  1998-99 2005-06 
Employment Status 
% of women who worked in past 12 months 23.4 33.8 
% of employed women who were paid in cash only 30.9 28 
Autonomy Indicators where respondent / wife only decides on: 
Obtaining health care for herself / own health care (in percentage) 25.7 27 
Purchasing jewellery or other major household item (in percentage) 7.2 5.6 
Visiting her parents or other relatives (in percentage) 8.4 6.4 
   
Source: National Family Health Survey 2 and 3, India   
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Table A.1 
Sample Restrictions 
 Total Tamil Nadu Uttar Pradesh 
Complete Sample 1842 983 859 
Excluded observations in which the 
husband did not respond. 1660 826 834 
Excluded observations in which the 
wife was married more than 
once. 
1624 809 815 
Excluded observations in which the 
husband was married more than 
once. 
1529 742 787 
 
 
 
